# Pragmatic Security (in the Cloud and on Earth)

Alisson Sol, Knowledge Engineer Engineering Excellence May 03, 2011

Public version

Engineering is only as good as the engineer. Be a better engineer.

# Objectives

- After attending this presentation, you'll:
  - Understand why security is essential for the quality of products/services
  - Know where to go for further info about the Security Development Lifecycle (SDL)
  - Know about the trends on security attacks
  - Have a reference to model attacks based on human behavior

## Takeaways and Call To Action

- Do threat models for traditional implementation bugs
- Human behavior is the weakest link exploited in most contemporary attacks on computer systems
- Do threat models for attacks based on human behavior

# Evaluation of Algorithms

### **Traditional Complexity**

MemoryProcessing

### Current

- Bandwidth
- Energy consumption
- Security


## SDL: Security Development Lifecycle

Ed	ucation		Process		Accountability						
Administer and track security training		teams	le product to meet SDL virements		criteria	lish release and sign-off art of FSR	Incident Response (MSRC)				
Training	Requirements	Design	Implementatio	n Ver	ification	Release	Response				
Core training	<ul> <li>Define quality gates/bug bar</li> <li>Analyze security and privacy risk</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Attack surface analysis</li> <li>Threat modeling</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Specify tools</li> <li>Enforce banned functions</li> <li>Static analysis</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Dynam testing</li> <li>Verify t model surface</li> </ul>	l threat s/attack	<ul> <li>Response plan</li> <li>Final security review</li> <li>Release archive</li> </ul>	Response     execution				



### **Ongoing Process Improvements**

# **Threat Modeling**



Each element in the Data Flow Diagram (DFD) is susceptible to one or more threat types

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Threat	Property
Spoofing	Authentication
Tampering	Integrity
<b>R</b> epudiation	Non-repudiation
Information Disclosure	Confidentiality
Denial of Service	Availability
Elevation of Privilege	Authorization

# Mitigate Everything?

Balance: security x usability

### Required Knowledge For Hackers Decreasing



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### References

http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc448435(PROT.10).aspx

### Development

#### Source Code History

### Similar Modules

auxiliary/admin/mssql/mssql\_enum auxiliary/admin/mssql/mssql\_idf auxiliary/admin/mssql/mssql\_sql

### Usage Information

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The Metasploit community has helped build this project. Now, let's make it even better. We need your brains, your talents, and your voice. Discover out how you can help.



**Module Options** 

### http://www.microsoft.com/SDL

#### United States - Change | All Nicrosoft Sites Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle Search Microsoft com bing Write more secure software. Watch a short video to learn how the Microsoft SDL can help your organization optimize its software LEARN HOW security. HOME DISCOVER LEARN ADOPT: RESOLIRCES Highlights Security Development Lifecycle? The SDL Progress Report TRAINING Training Learn about the evolution of the SDL and the role it's played in helping. Assess your organizational security Microsoft reduce vulnerabilities and develop successful threat mitigations. and privacy knowledge and establish MidAmerican: The SDL Chronicles Read this competing story about how one company improved its application Core Security security by transforming its culture and process. fraining. Security and the Software Development Lifecycle: Secure at the Source Read this independent Aberdeen Group research report on the positive ROI to investments in application security. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 LEARN AROUT IT NOW

## SDL Guidance for Agile Methodologies

- Requirements defined by frequency, not phase
  - Every-Sprint (most critical)
  - One-Time (non-repeating)
  - Bucket (all others)
- Great for projects without end dates, like cloud services



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# Conde Nast falls for \$8 million email trap

All it took was a single note requesting a change in payment accounts

### REUTERS

updated 4/4/2011 9:18:19 PM ET

NEW YORK— All it took was one email to swindle \$8 million from publishing company Conde Nast.

Papers filed by U.S. prosecutors in Manhattan said the publisher of magazines Vogue, Vanity Fair and the New Yorker, was tricked into thinking it was paying its regular printing company but was in fact being billed by a man identified as Andy Surface in Texas.

A company spokeswoman said Conde Nast does not comment on active legal proceedings.

Commercial printing company Quad/Graphics was not immediately available for comment.

The forfeiture allegation, filed in Manhattan federal court on March 30, was signed by a U. S. Secret Service agent. The Secret Service often investigates financial crimes.

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### ATTENTION: Malware asking for your consent



- Please confirm you agree with installing this malware that will:
- Log your keystrokes, including passwords and credit card information;
- Scan your machine for personal information and send to our servers;
- Send e-mail to your contacts in order to infect their machines.



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#### DOI:10.1145/1997852.1997872

Effective countermeasures depend on first understanding how users naturally fall victim to fraudsters.

BY FRANK STAJANO AND PAUL WILSON

Understanding **Scam Victims:** Seven **Principles** for Systems Security

knowledge, we examine a variety of scams, distilling some general principles of human behavior that explain why the scams work; we then show how they also apply to broader attacks on computer systems insofar as they involve humans. Awareness of the aspects of human psychology exploited by con artists helps not only the public avoid these particular scams but also security engineers build more robust systems.

Over nine series of the BBC TV documentary The Real Hustle (http://www. bbc.co.uk/realhustle/) Paul Wilson and Alexis Conran researched the scams most commonly carried out in Britain and, with Jessica-Jane Clement, replicated hundreds of them on unsuspecting victims while filming the action with hidden cameras. The victims were later debriefed, given their money back, and asked for their consent to publish the footage so others would learn not to fall for the same scams (see the sidebar "Representative Scams" to which we refer throughout the main text.)

The objective of the TV show was to help viewers avoid being ripped off by similar scams. Can security researchers do more? By carefully dissecting dozens of scams, we extracted seven recurring behavioral patterns and related principles exhibited by victims and exploited by hustlers. They are not merely small-scale opportunistic scams (known as "short cons") but in-

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## Human Behavior Causing Vulnerabilities

- Distraction
- Social Compliance
- Herd
- Dishonesty
- Kindness
- Need and Greed
- Time

### Distraction

While we are distracted by what grabs our interest, hustlers can do anything to us and we won't notice.

### 2000: ILOVEYOU

Attachment: LOVE-LETTER-FOR-YOU.

### Nigerian scam

I have some millions to transfer to your account... you get 20%.

# Social Compliance

- Society trains people to not question authority. Hustlers exploit this "suspension of suspiciousness" to make us do what they want.
- Mitnick, K.D., The Art of Deception: Controlling the Human Element of Security, 2002
  - Several cases of calling the police and getting information
  - Working with "someone in the chain" (receptionists, etc.)
- Message form your bank, FBI, IRS, etc.



Even suspicious marks let their guard down when everyone around them appears to share the same risks. Safety in numbers? Not if they're all conspiring against us.

### Online auctions

- Shills
- Reputation
- Group purchases

## Dishonesty

Our own larceny is what hooks us initially. Thereafter, anything illegal we do will be used against us by fraudsters.

Why most attacks go unreported?
 "You know you were participating in something wrong"
 Executive laptops hacked: malware promises

### Kindness

People are fundamentally nice and willing to help. Hustlers shamelessly take advantage of it.

- Scams with tragic events
  - Earthquakes, tsunamis, etc.
- In most companies, people will open the door for you
  - Just show up with a packages and fake difficulties with the badge

### Need and Greed

- Our needs and desires make us vulnerable. Once hustlers know what we want, they can easily manipulate us.
- Best way to distract people: what they crave for
   Employment scam
- Security x usability



When under time pressure to make an important choice, we use a different decision strategy, and hustlers steer us toward one involving less reasoning.

### Phishing

- Confirm your data before DD/MM/YY or you will lose access
- Limited time discount

## Are There Mitigations?

### User education

- Case-by-case model for threat and then mitigation
  - Banks log out automatically after time pass
  - Protocols requiring two people to authorize "action" (safeguard)

### Identity systems

- Move from "what you know" or "what you have" to "who you are"
  - Big challenge for cloud-based systems
  - "Please reset my password" a top customer service request

# Will Cloud Computing Change Something?

- Regarding the traditional threats
  - Increase rewards: one attack, multiple benefits
- Regarding human behavior
  - Increase attack surface: multiple opportunities for single target

### **Review Your Software Product/Service**

- Distraction
- Social Compliance
- Herd
- Dishonesty
- Kindness
- Need and Greed
- Time

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### Resources

- Understanding Scam Victims: Seven Principles for Systems Security by Frank Stajano, Paul Wilson University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory <u>Technical Report 754</u>, August 2009
- Understanding Scam Victims: Seven Principles for Systems Security by Frank Stajano, Paul Wilson Communications of the ACM, Mar/2011, Vol. 54, No. 3, pp. 70-75
- Foundations of Security: What Every Programmer Needs To Know by Neil Daswani, Christoph Kern, and Anita Kesavan
- Cloud Security and Privacy by Tim Mather, Subra Kumaraswamy, Shahed Latif



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